Assessing overexploitation in Mediterranean aquifers using system stability condition analysis by Ibañez Puerta, Javier et al.
Assessing overexploitation in Mediterranean aquifers using 
system stability condition analysis 
Javier Ibanez , Jaime Martinez Vaiderrama , Juan Puigdefabregas 
Dpto. Estadistica y Metodos de Gestion en Agriculture, Uniuersidad Politecnica de Madrid, Spain 
Estacion Experimental de Zonas Aridas, Consejo Superior de Inuestigaciones Cientfficas, Spain 
A B S T R A C T 
This paper analyses competitive groundwater exploitation for irrigation by means of a spe-
cial case of a dynamic predator-prey or human-resource theoretical model. On the human 
side, the model considers both farmers' rational behaviour and a set of economic parame-
ters. Then the model explicitly links these issues to the dynamics of the natural resource. 
Equilibrium states are evaluated, and the drivers and conditions for final states leading to 
groundwater overexploitation are assessed. The theoretical model finally serves to discuss 
the long-term sustainability of the processes of transformation from traditional to highly 
intensive pumping-based agricultural systems. These are processes now taking place in 
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1. Groundwater management in arid 
Mediterranean regions 
The gradual expansion of pumping for irrigation across Euro-
pean countries reached the sunny lands of south-eastern 
Spain in the second half of the 20th century, as soon as public 
funds and economies of scale made it so that farmers could 
afford to acquire the required technology (Martinez Vicente 
et al , 1989; Tout, 1990). Until then groundwater reserves had 
remained practically unaltered. First the shortage and then 
the excessive cost of appropriate soil-drilling techniques had 
left aquifers in a virgin state. 
Thanks to pumping, water is now no longer a constraint on 
crop yields in these arid regions. Additionally, on account of 
sand-plot techniques and greenhouses, crops can be grown in 
a suitable environment, which has largely unshackled produc-
tion from the surrounding natural conditions. However, a great 
deal of pesticides and fertilizers has to be used in this highly 
intensive production system. Also a lot of labour is required, 
and this has to be cheap to balance the budget. The solution is 
immigration from African countries, and, because of its prox-
imity, mainly from the Maghreb. In this way, it is possible to 
harvest selected crop varieties as often as five times a year, 
and supply the European markets with fresh goods all year 
round. This is the key to the economic success of the Spanish 
greenhouses. 
A paradigmatic example of this type of agriculture is 
Campo de Dallas (Almeria, Spain), where wastelands have 
been converted into a field of plastic. This area has grown 
from the initial 20 experimental hectares to the current fig-
ure of 30,000. As a result, what was one of Spain's poorest 
regions now has the biggest ratio of banks per capita. But, 
on the other hand, piezometric levels are getting deeper and 
deeper. This is perceived by farmers in the form of increased 
pumping costs. Also water salinity is rising, and this narrows 
the range of alternative crops or even forces them out of some 
terrains. 
The financial impact of groundwater exploitation in 
Spain has resounded as far as the Maghreb's remote oasis 
societies. There, traditional water management and dis-
tribution laws were carefully established: surface water 
resources were distributed in times of use depending on 
availability, and additional water was captured by gravita-
tional force through khettaras, underground tunnels dug 
into the rock to reach aquifers. However, remittances and 
knowledge acquired by emigrants are favouring the adop-
tion of pumping, and triggering changes in the traditional 
systems (Puigdefabregas and Mendizabal, 2004; De Haas, 
2001). 
Groundwater exploitation in Spain initially followed a com-
petitive strategy, that is to say, farmers owned their wells and 
pumped water without any agreement with other farmers. 
However, after symptoms of overexploitation were noticed in 
different aquifers, irrigation communities have gradually been 
established, either voluntarily or enforced by the authorities. 
The aim is to regulate pumping and turn to a social strategy of 
exploitation. In the Maghreb, the opposite transformation is 
currently taking place: social systems of aquifer exploitation 
are being displaced by competitive strategies of pumping, as 
self-sufficient subsistence farming is transformed into open 
economy agriculture. 
This paper analyses the competitive strategy of groundwa-
ter management by means of a set of dynamic equations. The 
model, which is described in Section 2, is a particular applica-
tion of the general human-resource model proposed by Ibanez 
et al. (2008). It serves to formally express the long-term sys-
tem equilibrium (Section 3) and also to assess the drivers and 
the conditions for this equilibrium to imply aquifer overex-
ploitation (Section 4). The modelling procedure gives us some 
keys for theoretically discussing water exploitation in Mediter-
ranean aquifers (Section 5). 
2. A model of the competitive exploitation 
of groundwater for agricultural production 
As pointed out above, this section particularizes a previ-
ously stated human-resource model (Ibanez et al., 2008) to 
represent the competitive strategy of aquifer exploitation. 
Throughout the description, capital letters are employed 
to name variables and small letters to denote parame-
ters. 
2.1. Number of hectares irrigated by pumping 
Let U be the current number of hectares irrigated with water 
pumped from the aquifer, i.e. not including hectares irrigated 
by traditional systems in oases. The rate of variation of U is 
given by 
dU _ UD - U 
dt ~ uat ' (2.1) 
where UD is the target number of irrigated hectares and 'uat' 
is the adjustment time. 
2.2. Target number of hectares irrigated by pumping 
First, we assume that there exist a fixed maximum num-
ber of arable (i.e. irrigable) hectares denoted by 'umx'. This 
constraint is due to factors that are exogenous to the model 
(i.e. geographic or biophysical limitations). Second, only those 
farmers whose opportunity cost per owned hectare is less 
than the average per hectare profit, Pu, would be inter-
ested in adopting the pumping-based agricultural production 
system. For this to be possible there has to be some sort 
of special rationale driving the farmer's behaviour. Note, 
however, that the model does not assume that this moti-
vation is there from the very start. The adjustment time 
'uat' in Eq. (2.1) would be partially related to the process of 
a gradual change of mentality, if any. Third, the opportu-
nity cost is assumed to be randomly distributed across the 
hectares, following an exponential probability distribution, 
i.e. the greater the opportunity cost, the less likely it is. The 
target number of irrigated hectares, UD, then, is expressed 
by 
UD = umx < 1 - exp 
-max(0,Pu) (2.2) 
where 'aoc' is the average per hectare opportunity cost. Note 
that the term in brackets represents the cumulative distribu-
tion function of the exponential random variable opportunity 
cost particularized to the average per hectare profit Pu, that 
is to say, the probability of finding a per hectare opportunity 
cost that is equal to or less than Pu- This probability is equal 
to the fraction of the total area, 'umx', that is the target area at 
any one time. For example, if the average per hectare profit is 
greater than the opportunity costs for every hectare, this prob-
ability is one, and the target number of hectares is 'umx'. The 
max(-) function in Eq. (2.2) assures that the minimum number 
of target hectares is zero. 
2.3. Production function 
The average per hectare production function is 
R?, Qu = tch Ru - 0.5 
eqx 
(2.3) 
where Ru is the average per hectare endowment of water, 'tch' 
is a technology-related parameter and 'eqx' is the endow-
ment of water allowing maximum production, i.e. Q]fax = 
0.5 tch eqx. Note that endowments of water greater than 'eqx' 
imply decreasing yields per hectare. 
'eqx' could be thought as taking the general form en (1 + *), 
en being the potential evapotranspiration and <P>0 a coef-
ficient that could reflect, for example, the excess of water 
needed for soil salt lixiviation. This makes the model com-
patible with an irrigated area affected by a slight to moderate 
salinization problem, but never with one where water qual-
ity is the main factor determining the limit for agricultural 
production. 
2.4. Pro/it per hectare 
The average per hectare profit is given by 
Pu = prq Qu - CRRU - feu, (2.4) 
where 'prq' is the average production price received, Cj> is the 
average marginal cost of water and 'feu' are the average fixed 
costs per hectare. Given that the cost of lifting water increases 
with the piezometric depth of the stock of groundwater, which 
is called R, Cj> must be a decreasing function of R. This is 
assumed to be exponential: 
CR = c r 0 e x p ( ^ ) , (2.5) 
where cro' is the maximum cost of pumping, i.e. the cost of 
getting the last volume of water, R is the stock of groundwater 
and 'per' is a parameter. Note that if Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5) are 
substituted into Eq. (2.4), Pu is a function of R and Ru-
2.5. Water demand (endowment) per hectare 
We assume that the owners of the transformed irrigated 
hectares aim to maximize their own short-term profit, which 
means that groundwater is exploited competitively. This hap-
pens when the value of the marginal product of water is 
equated with the marginal cost Cj>, i.e. prq dQu/dRu = prq tch 
[l-(Ru/eqx)] = CR. The farmers follow a hill-climbing heuris-
tic to find the optimal demand for water. This means that 
they have a target demand for water, RUD, which is anchored 
to current demand, but varies in the economically expected 
manner under disequilibrium situations (Sterman, 2000). The 
average values represented in the model would also reflect this 
process. This can be formally expressed by making 
RUD = R o ( p r q t C h [ 1 - ( R u / e q X ) i y r r (2.6) 
where 'srr' is a parameter. Note that, for example, if the 
value of the marginal product of water is greater/less than the 
marginal cost, the target demand RUD will be greater/less than 
the current demand Ru (we avoid repeating "average" before 
each of the mentioned variables). The parameter 'srr' quanti-
fies the sensitivity of RUD to changes in the relative return to 
water. The hill-climbing heuristic is completed by making 
dRu _ RUD - Ru , . 
dt ~ rat ^ ' ' 
where 'rat' is the adjustment time. 
As the water table go deeper with the development of 
pumping the probability of finding wells where the drawdown 
becomes excessive could increase, especially in thin aquifers. 
The rate of extraction descends or even cancels out in those 
wells, so that the average endowment of water in the area will 
fall. If such process is likely to occur in the modelled system 
its effect on Ru could be captured by adding to Eq. (2.7) a mul-
tiplier ranging from 1 to 0 as the value of R decreases. This 
possibility is disregarded here. 
2.6. Stock of groundwater 
As a simplifying assumption, groundwater is used for nothing 
but irrigation. Also, farmers of the pump-irrigated hectares 
reject water naturally discharged by the aquifer considering 
it to be a very unpredictable supply. Therefore, the rate of 
variation of the stock of accessible groundwater R is given by 
d R / R \ d P 2 
^ = rec - dpi ( — ) - ( l - r fc )URu. (2.8) dt \rmxj 
The term 'rec' is the average annual recharge, which is related 
to rainfall, and 'rfc' is the fraction of pumped water that perco-
lates back into the aquifer. The second term of Eq. (2.8) is the 
natural discharge rate. This rate is expressed by a decreasing 
function of the stock R where 'rmx' is the maximum aquifer 
capacity and 'dpi ' and 'dp2' are parameters. This formulation 
allows to freely establishing how fast the natural discharge 
decay with R. Note that it is possible to make natural discharge 
disappears even at a quite great value of R simply by making 
'dp2' high enough. 
For the virgin initial conditions (without pumps, or U=0), 
the equilibrium of the stock of groundwater, which we will call 
'rne', is reached when rec = dpl(R/rmx)dP2. In this way, solving 
forR: 
/
 r e c \ Vdp2 
rne = r m x ( — ) . (2.9) 
Under development (U>0), it can be shown that Eq. (2.8) 
allows reflecting the condition, stated by Bredehoeft (2002), 
that pumps captures the difference between virgin and equi-
librium natural discharges at sustainability. 
Finally, the model has a yearly basis. Evaluation of ground 
water would be done at the end of winter when pumping has 
been at a minimum for some months. It is assumed the full 
recovery of the water table (not the water volume) during this 
period. In this way, local well hydraulics is circumvented in 
the model. 
3. Long-term equilibrium of the modelled 
system 
The question of what the final state of an aquifer already 
involved in or gradually developing a competitive strategy of 
groundwater exploitation could be explored by analyzing the 
isoclines of the model described in the last section. As is well 
known, an isocline defines the points in the phase space where 
the rate of variation of a state variable equals zero. 
eqx 
r + 
rrf 
Fig. 1 - The isocline of the per hectare demand for water. 
The isocline of the per hectare demand for water 
(dRu/dt=0), after substituting CR by Eq. (2.5), is1 
R^u = eqx max cr0 / - R prqtch Vpcr (3.1) 
The 'max' function is needed to rule out negative demands 
for water. Note that the expression for per hectare water 
endowment in equilibrium is the conventional inverted expo-
nential used as the predator functional response in many 
predator-prey type models (Fig. 1). 
For any value of R under 'rrf there is no demand for water 
in the equilibrium. Making Ru = 0 in Eq. (3.1) and solving for R 
we get 
rrf = -per In /prqtch 
V cr0 
(3.2) 
If prq tch < cr0 then 'rrf is a positive stock of groundwater, 
which, due to economic and technical constraints, is inacces-
sible for exploitation (Fig. 1). However, if prq tch > cr0, farmers 
could demand in principle even the last drop of groundwater. 
The isocline of the stock of groundwater (dR/dt=0), after 
solving for U, is given by 
rec - dpl(R/rmx)dp2 
(1 - rfc)Ru (3.3) 
The 'min' function is needed because the upper boundary of 
the number of hectares is always 'umx'. Below this limit, Eq. 
(3.3) is simply the aquifer's net rate of recharge divided by the 
net consumption of water per hectare. 
Finally, the isocline of the transformed hectares (dU/dt= 0) 
UD = umx < 1 - exp 
- max(0, Pu) (3.4) 
The per hectare profit Pu, which, remember, depends on R 
and Ru, is given in Eq. (2.4). The adjustment times needed for 
the equilibrium of both the groundwater stock and the trans-
formed hectares depend on things like the rate at which an 
economic rationale for agricultural production spreads, the 
rrf rpO rcr R* rne R 
Fig. 2 - An instance of (1) the isoclines of both the 
transformed hectares (Uu) and the stock of groundwater 
(UR); (2) the final steady state of the system (R*, U*), and (3) 
the trajectory of a complete transformation from a 
traditional to a competitive system of exploitation (dashed 
arrow). 
time taken to acquire the initial capital, the time required 
to dig a well and install the irrigation system. These adjust-
ment times are necessarily far greater than it would take 
farmers already producing (i.e. already having an economic 
rationale) to adjust their water demands to equilibrium. This 
would mainly depend on the time it takes to find out the cur-
rent technical and economic parameter values of interest (e.g. 
prices, cost). In this way, we can adopt the quasi-steady state 
assumption (Edelstein-Keshet, 1988) according to which Ru 
can be substituted by its equilibrium value in Eqs. (3.3) and 
(3.4). Clearly, this substitution results in the isoclines UR and 
Uu being two functions of R. Fig. 2 illustrates the generic form 
of these two isoclines and the parametric values delimiting 
them. 
The curve UR represents the points in the phase plane (R, 
U) where there is no variation of water levels and Uu those 
points where there is no variation of the irrigated hectares. 
Therefore, the steady-state or long-term equilibrium of both R 
and U is reached simultaneously only at the intersection point 
(R*, U*). 
The isocline UR obviously intersects with the axis U=0 at 
the virgin volume R = rne (Eq. (2.9)). Given that Ru is in the 
divisor of UR, this rises to infinity at rrf. So it is clear that 
the system equilibrium could never fall below this stock of 
groundwater. Clearly, too, the intersection of the isocline Uu 
with the axis U=0 is the value of the stock of groundwater 
that makes the per hectare profit exactly zero (after substi-
tuting Ru by its equilibrium value, Pu is just a function of R). 
This stock of groundwater has been labelled as rpo in Fig. 2. 
Finally, note that for R = rrf or, alternatively, for Ru = 0, the per 
hectare profit is Pu= -feu (see Eq. (2.4)). In other words, if no 
water is employed for irrigation there is no production and no 
returns, although fixed cost must be paid yet. This means that 
profit has to be exactly zero before R comes to be equal to rrf. 
Therefore, for any positive per hectare fixed cost, feu (i.e. for 
any aquifer, in fact), it is verified that 
rp0 > rrf. (3.5) 
1
 In the isoclines' notation, the superscript denote the respec-
tive state variable. For example, UR is the isocline of R, which is 
eventually solved for U. 
That is, the average profit cancels out at a greater stock 
of groundwater than that making the average per hectare 
demand of water to be zero. 
Our model of a competitively exploited aquifer can be seen 
as a special case of a predator-prey system, where, obviously, 
groundwater resembles the prey and the transformed hectares 
are predators. It can be demonstrated (Ibafiez et al., 2004) that 
any intersection of UR and Uu constitutes a steady state of the 
system, given that it always satisfies the conditions for this 
first established by Rosenzweig and MacArthur (1963). 
As an example of time trajectory, consider an oasis initially 
managed in a traditional way, i.e. only employing water com-
ing from the natural discharge of the aquifer, which gradually 
shifts to a competitive pumping-based system of production. 
This trajectory would start at the point (rne, 0) of the phase 
plane and end at the steady state (R*, IP) (Fig. 2, dashed arrow). 
The time employed in this process of transformation will vary 
for each particular case, and the transient period could show 
some instability, with the presence of damped oscillations. No 
general prediction can be made for the number of transformed 
hectares in the final state; they could in fact be less than the 
number of hectares that were irrigated under the traditional 
system. The only sure thing about the final state of the mod-
elled system is that it will be established at a lower stock of 
groundwater than the virgin value 'rne'. This is due to the 
development of pumping, a flow of consumption which was 
absent or negligible in the initial oasis. 
4. The drivers of aquifer overexploitation 
First of all, it should be stressed that, for any given aquifer, 
the finding that the rate of net recharge (i.e. recharge less nat-
ural discharge) is less than the rate of consumption (i.e. total 
pumping less water returning to the aquifer) is a necessary but 
not a sufficient indicator of overexploitation. As explained at 
the end of last section, the development of pumping implies 
that the stock of groundwater at steady state will necessarily 
be less than it was originally. And for such a stock's decrease 
to occur, net pumping necessarily has to be greater than net 
recharge during the transient period. 
The key question for assessing the risk of long-term aquifer 
overexploitation, then, is to determine what the values of 
both the stock and the hectares at which the disequilibrium 
between rates will stop are or, equivalently, what the position 
of the steady state point (R*, IP) is. Overexploitation will hap-
pen if this final state is to the left of some critical (assumed 
known) value of the stock, that is to say, if R* is to the left of 
the axis R = rcr in the phase plane (see Fig. 2). 'rcr' could be, for 
example, the volume of water needed to avoid unacceptable 
drawdown in particular wells. Of course, rcr = 0 means that 
long-term overexploitation occurs when the stock of ground-
water is depleted. 
Simply by looking at Fig. 2, we find that a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for overexploitation is 
rp0 < rcr (4.1) 
That is, for the long-term overexploitation of an aquifer it 
is necessary but not sufficient that the stock of groundwater 
making the per hectare average profit to cancel out be lesser 
than the critical stock 'rcr'. Given Eq. (3.5), condition (4.1) also 
implies that rrf <rcr. 
V + i 
Fig. 3 - Isoclines in a case of long-term overexploitation. 
Let UR(rcr) and Uu(rcr) be the intersection points of UR 
and Uu with R = rcr, respectively (Fig. 3). The necessary and 
sufficient condition for the long-term overexploitation of the 
modelled aquifer is 
UR(rcr) < Uu(rcr). (4.2) 
It is unfeasible to get the mathematical expressions of rpo, 
UR(rcr) and Uu(rcr), but their values for any applied case can 
always be obtained by numerical simulation if the involved 
parameters are known. 
Fig. 4 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis of the posi-
tion of (R*, IP) under ceteris paribus conditions. The solid lines 
indicate the original isoclines and the dotted lines indicate 
the isoclines after altering the parameters. In all cases, the 
axis R = rcr has been positioned ad hoc to show the shift of the 
steady state from a sustainable to a long-term overexploited 
situation. 
Note that for the cases a-d the value of rpo stands still. This 
means that it would be sufficient to check that Eq. (4.1) does 
not hold to expect the long-term sustamability of an aquifer 
facing any of the parameter variations showed in those graphs. 
Of course, many of the model parameters actually vary in 
time. This means that the position of the final steady-state for 
a given pumped aquifer also continuously changes in time. In 
this way, to make a particular assessment of condition (4.2) to 
a real-world case either representative time parameter values 
(e.g. averages, modes or medians) should be used or, much 
better, the assessment should be repeated at interval of years. 
In doing so, the overall long-term sustamability of a process of 
agricultural transformation could be foreseen using Eq. (4.2). 
5. The case of Mediterranean aquifers 
Many studies assured, under the umbrella of dependency 
theory, that capital injection from western into underdevel-
oped countries tended to depress local economies. Common 
assumptions were that remittances substituted agricultural 
production that only survived as a sentimental or ritual activ-
ity and that they were diluted in the purchase of luxury goods 
and other investments rated as non-productive. However, 
recent studies have shown that remittances and knowledge 
provided by emigrants are being invested both in the mod-
ernisation of agriculture and other economic activities and 
that, particularly, this socioeconomic activity is triggering 
U'k. 
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Fig. 4 - Sensitivity analysis of the steady state under ceteris paribus conditions. The solid lines correspond to the original 
isoclines (sustainable system); the dotted lines denote isoclines after the indicated parameter variations (overexploited 
system), (a) Decreasing aoc, increasing umx; (b) decreasing rfc; (c) decreasing rec; (d) decreasing rmx or dp2, increasing dpi; 
(e) decreasing feu; (f) increasing prq tch; (g) increasing eqx; (h) decreasing per or crO. 
changes in traditional water management in Maghreb's oases 
(Puigdefabregas and Mendizabal, 2004; De Haas, 2001). 
The model proposed earlier is used in this section as 
a means for discussing what impact the exchange of both 
capital and labour between Mediterranean countries can be 
expected to have on sustainable groundwater management. In 
this way, we assess the expected long-term impacts of (i) the 
current development of pumping in Maghreb's oases associ-
ated to remittances and (ii) the incoming of cheap labour force 
to irrigated agriculture in south-eastern Spain. 
Then, suppose that the model is firstly referred to some 
generic aquifer of a Maghreb oasis. Remittances can be con-
sidered to affect four of the model's parameters: the maximum 
number of irrigable hectares, 'umx'; the technology-related 
factor of production, 'tch'; the fraction of pumped water that 
percolates back into the aquifer, 'rfc'; and the average per 
hectare opportunity cost, 'aoc'. 
External capital and knowledge of appropriate techniques 
are likely to result in investments in sanding and terracing. 
This means that arable lands can be extended by trans-
forming terrains outside the oases into agricultural lands 
but with access to groundwater. Evidence of this has been 
found, for example, in Todgha valley (De Haas, 2001). The 
parameter that represents the potential arable land in the 
proposed model is 'umx'. As Fig. 4a illustrates, an increase 
in 'umx' leads to a decrease in the stock of groundwater at 
equilibrium, which could potentially be set under the criti-
cal value 'rcr'. Therefore, remittances would favour aquifer 
overexploitation in the Maghreb by increasing the arable 
land. 
However, some fraction of remittances is simultaneously 
invested in alternative businesses to agriculture so that the 
overall economy of the Maghreb countries is being developed. 
This means that farmers' opportunity cost, and, therefore, 
also 'aoc', are growing. Going back to Fig. 4a, we find that an 
increase in 'aoc' implies an increase in the stock of ground-
water at equilibrium. Therefore, remittances would favour the 
sustainability of the Maghreb's aquifers by increasing farmers' 
opportunity cost. 
Fig. 4a also shows that the qualitative effect on equilibrium 
of increasing 'aoc' is exactly the opposite to that of increasing 
'umx'. Thus, the two effects of remittances mentioned so far 
are expected to counterbalance each other in some way. 
Thirdly, remittances also favour investment in highly effi-
cient irrigation systems to enhance productivity, that is, to get 
more production per volume of water employed for irrigation. 
This means that remittances increase 'tch' and decrease 'rfc'. 
Figs. 4b and 4f show that both of those shifts imply reducing 
the stock of water at equilibrium, which could potentially be 
set under 'rcr'. Hence, remittances would also favour aquifer 
overexploitation by increasing the investment in irrigation 
technology (Kendy, 2003, also finds possible negative effects 
of technology on ground water sustainability). 
The question is, then, can the effect of remittances on 'aoc', 
favouring sustainability, be expected to exceed the sum of the 
overexploiting effects of remittances through 'umx', 'rfc' and 
'tch'? In other words, could remittances increase alternative 
incomes for farmers enough to make them compete with the 
expected incomes from intensive agriculture? Or, could an 
investor easily find capital yields in the Maghreb's economy 
comparable to earnings from intensive agriculture? An affir-
mative response to all of these questions seems very unlikely 
indeed, especially after knowing the Spanish case. As a result, 
remittances should be taken as potential drivers of aquifer 
overexploitation in Maghreb oases and, therefore, some form 
of agreement between farmers and some common rules of 
groundwater exploitation should be favoured there as soon as 
possible. 
Now consider the case of a competitively exploited aquifer 
for intensive agriculture in south-eastern Spain. Here, the 
demand for non-specialized labour attracts lots of immigrants 
which are bringing down wages for agricultural labourers in 
Spain. 
Let us take our model again now referred to a Spanish 
aquifer. The decrease in wages due to the high supply of cheap 
labour reduces the fixed cost parameter, 'feu'. As expected, 
and as Fig. 4e shows, the drop in 'feu' favours resource over-
exploitation: the stock of groundwater in equilibrium could 
potentially fall below 'rcr'. Therefore, low wages for immigrant 
agricultural labour would favour aquifer overexploitation in 
Spain adding to their social effects undesirable environmen-
tal consequences. Suitable minimum wages should be assured 
for this labour. 
Now let us suppose that some fraction of the labour for 
intensive agriculture in southern Spain comes from Maghreb's 
oases. This seems likely because in doing so they will learn 
about irrigated agricultural systems and will earn some money 
that could be invested in transforming their agricultural pro-
duction systems. If this were the case, the processes of 
exploitation of Mediterranean aquifers for irrigation would be 
linked to one another and such links would be reinforcing 
groundwater overexploitation on both sides of the Mediter-
ranean Sea. 
Be this possibility true or not, it is important know-
ing how to foresee groundwater overexploitation in aquifers 
supporting processes of transformation from traditional to 
highly intensive agriculture. This paper has proposed and 
exemplified a general procedure for helping such early-stage 
monitoring in particular aquifers. Briefly, it consists in (i) for-
mulating a theoretical dynamic model of the relationship 
between the irrigated hectares and the aquifer; (ii) deducing 
the long-term equilibrium of the model; (iii) establishing the 
formal conditions for that equilibrium to mean overexploita-
tion in the long term; and (iv) assessing if these conditions hold 
for the particular case by quantifying the involved parameters. 
In this way, if the initial theoretical model is adapted to the 
numerical information available, the risk of overexploitation 
could be grossly but easily monitored periodically. Moreover, 
the procedure is an example of how different matters, char-
acteristic of ecology, economics, ground water dynamics and 
sustainable development, can be explicit and formally put to 
work jointly. 
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